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How to stop computerized vote stealing
by Bill Forman Monday, Nov. 03, 2008 at 12:44 AM

The Democrats need to ask the Courts to quarantine all computerized voting machines in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Florida, North Carolina and any other state where Sen. Obama had a lead in the polls before the election but lost the election because the votes may have been flipped for McCain.

There is little or no evidence of vote malfunctions going to the Democrat so probably
the machines are doing what they were programmed to do. Steal Democrat votes and
give them to the Republican. Diebold is able to make ATM’s that work – why haven’t they
corrected this problem or do they even want to. Most if not all of the machines that count
our vote are owned by Republicans.

Later on in this report there is evidence that Bush received an 8 million vote gain from
probable vote flipping. A “bad memory card” reported votes correctly in every race except
the presidential race, where it changed Gore’s total to a minus 16,022. (This could have
happened by inserting into the voter-database a minus 100,000 votes for Gore and a
plus 100,000 votes for Bush. The problem showed up when only 83,978 votes were
cast for Gore in this precinct leaving the 16,022 minus vote. How many other
precincts had a similar minus applied to Gore’s totals but were not caught because
the total votes for him were more than the minus inserted into his totals against him?)

Did you know that the counting of your vote has become privatized with proprietary
software that does not allow anyone to know how our votes are being counted? The only
way we can get our voting system back is to closely watch how the votes are counted –
from individual polling stations all the way to the total vote count for each State.

Contact the Democrat leaders in your state to request that an audit trail be established
beginning with the voting totals at each polling place. A spread sheet listing each polling
place for each city would include the total votes for each Presidential candidate.

A count of the number of people registered Democrat and Republican at each polling place
needs to be made and compared to the actual totals for each candidate. These totals will
not be exactly the same as the total votes cast but will be a check against a minus 100,000
votes for Obama and a plus 100,000 votes for McCain being added to the computer totals
before any real votes are added to the computer. See reference pages 156 & 171 later on in
this report, from the book “Black Box Voting” (BBV) by Bev Harris.

The audit trail totals for each city would then be transferred to a county spread sheet and
the county spread sheet totals would have to equal the totals for each state that is generated
by the computers. We will be assured of a fair vote count if the computer generated totals
are equal to the audit trail totals for each candidate.

We should assume a worse case scenario and expect the voting machines have or will be
hacked giving votes and the election to McCain. There is a good possibility that voting
machines in Pennsylvania will be hacked because McCain has said that he and his running
mate will be spending a lot of time there and that will be the reason given for Pa. going to
him. The possibility of vote stealing is true for all of the “battleground” states.

To do now: A plan of action needs to be in place. Should papers be ready to be filed that
requires all voting machines to be quarantined after the election until forensic computer
experts have had a chance to examine the voting machines & the “central tabulator” in all
the contested states for signs of voter fraud?

Early voting provides an opportunity for electronic viewing & possible manipulation of
vote totals now. See Page 105 of “Black Box Voting” when files were date-stamped on an
election day five hours before the polls closed. Also see page 166 when the vote totals
saved at 3:31 PM equaled the final vote tally. Obviously the totals were fiction.

As recently as the latest primary in New Hampshire wards and towns using Diebold’s
AccuVote Optical-Scan voting machine learned that chronic problems continue with the
company's infamous paper-ballot voting machines. The vote count in every state with
electronic voting is suspect. Bev Harris of said that
Diebold has placed some 50,000 machines in 37 states and their track record is causing
Harris, Johns Hopkins University professors and others great concern.

Johns Hopkins researchers at the Information Security Institute issued a report declaring
that Diebold’s electronic voting software contained “stunning flaws.” The researchers
concluded that vote totals could be altered at the voting machines and by remote access.
If you look at Diebold’s website it talks about ATM software and
remote teller retail banking software and a host of other security services that Diebold
provides. How can all the other services work while their voting software continually has
problems? Have you ever heard of an ATM paying out more money than it should?

After the election a class action lawsuit should be filed on behalf of the voting public
against voting machine owners to determine if they are guilty of any crime by developing
and using vote counting software in their machines that does not protect the integrity of the
vote count and instead is seemingly designed to allow vote hacking. If there is a law
against stealing votes should RICO statutes be used to determine if there was collusion
among the owners to allow votes to be stolen in a series of specified criminal violations.
Another lawsuit should determine if privatized voting using proprietary software is legal.

Bev Harris’s website includes 16 chapters of her “Black
Box Voting” (BBV) book in pdf format that tell about vote count problems in many states
and why an audit trail needs to be established for this election.

Page 86 of BBV - When you privatize a thing like the vote, strange things happen. For
example, you can’t ask any questions. Jim March, a California Republican, filed a public
records request in Alameda County, California, to ask about the voting machines it had
entrusted with his vote. The county's reply: “Please be advised that the county will not
provide the information you requested ... The County will not allow access or disclose any
information regarding the Diebold election system as any information relating to that
system is exempted from the PRA (Public Records Act) ... The system provided by
Diebold Election Systems Inc. (“DESI”) is a proprietary system that is recognized as such
in the contract between the County and DESI...

Page 88-89 of BBV - David Allen took one look at the page and snorted incredulously. “Incredible
stupidity.” “Click ‘Pub’ ” he suggested. We did. What follows is the first detailed look - ever – into
a secret voting system. What do you do when you find 40,000 secret files on an unprotected file
transfer site on the Internet? …
What if you knew that the devil went down to Georgia on November 5, 2002, and handed that
state an election with six upsets, tossing triple-amputee war veteran Max Cleland out of the
U.S. Senate in favor of a candidate who ran ads calling Cleland unpatriotic?
Suppose you knew that in Georgia, the first Republican governor in 134 years had been elected
despite trailing in every poll, and that African American candidates fared poorly even in their own
If you learned that these machines had been installed just prior to an election — and then you saw a
folder called “rob-georgia,” looked inside, and found instructions to replace the files in the new
Georgia voting system with something unknown, what would you do? I kept asking if anyone
knew who Rob was. Everyone told me there was no employee named Rob in Georgia. Perhaps rob
was a verb?

Page 93-94 of BBV
Harris: “But Wyle decided not to test the patch, you say. Was this patch put on all the
machines or just some of the machines?”
Barnes: “All the machines.”
Harris: “So every machine in Georgia got this program update.”
Barnes: “Yes, every one of the machines used on election day in November.

OK, let’s regroup. So far, we have thousands of defective voting systems that somehow made it
through Wyle’s hardware testing, Ciber’s software testing, Diebold’s factory testing, rigorous
testing on arrival at the Georgia warehouse and more testing when delivered to each of Georgia’s
159 counties. But the machines didn’t work. Then we have a set of file replacements called “rob-
georgia,” and a Georgia state elections official telling us they replaced files on all 22,000 machines
in Georgia… What we have here is a group of Georgia election officials running around the state
replacing the computer commands in the voting system right before the election.

Page 100-102
Harris: “There was an unprotected FTP site which contained software and hardware specifications,
some source code and lots of files. One file on that site was called “rob-georgia,” and this file
contained files with instructions to ‘replace GEMS files with these’ and ‘replace Windows files
with these and run program.’ Does this concern you?”
Dr. Williams: “I’m not familiar with that FTP site.”

The file includes one folder containing replacements for the Windows operating
system and two folders with replacement files that are not for Windows. You don’t need to be a
computer scientist to see this: Just look at the file names, which instruct the user to alter the GEMS
program. GEMS is not part of the Windows operating system. Someone should have looked at
these. Someone should have looked at all these files, but no one did. In fact, no one has any idea
what was on those Georgia voting machines on Nov. 5, 2002. Georgia certified an illegal election.

Page 105
On the FTP site were files designated for counties in California, Maryland, Arizona, Kentucky,
Colorado, Texas, Georgia, North Carolina, Kansas and Virginia. Some files, like one for San Luis
Obispo County, California, were date-stamped on an election day (curiously, five hours before the
polls closed). (does this mean the totals were electronically accessed at that time?)

Page 106
At the county election supervisor’s office, the results from all the polling places are tabulated using
a program called GEMS, and the password, “GEMSUSER,” was in the user manual. A cracker
who wants to pretend he is the elections supervisor might start by installing one of the GEMS vote-
tallying programs on his home computer. There were over 100 versions of this program on the FTP
site, many of which were never certified but were used anyway.

The “rob Georgia file shows how Georgia votes were probably stolen and triple amputee
Max Cleland lost his Senate seat. The reason given was because Bush visited the state the
week-end before the election and the power of his personality caused voters to switch.
They haven’t changed the playbook and probably plan on doing the same in Pa.

In Pres. Bush’s re-election victory over John Kerry – Kerry had a commanding lead
according to the exit polls (subsequently adjusted to reflect the computer generated totals).
That lead evaporated after a computer malfunction that stopped the counting for at least an
hour. When the computer came back on line Bush had a commanding lead that caused
Kerry to concede without contesting the vote count. The odds of a switch in the exit poll
totals to final vote totals from one candidate to another in three different states suggest that
many votes were stolen. The audit trail would eliminate that possibility.

Currently when exit poll numbers are adjusted to reflect the computer (hacked)
totals they hide the fact that the totals are wrong. Exit polls numbers should not be
adjusted to reflect the final vote because they are needed to establish the states having
suspect vote totals. The report by
Faun Otter shows that Az., Co., La., Mi., Ia., NM., Me., Nv., Ark., & Mo., exit polls were
not adjusted when they were published. However, if we look at some other states, the
figures are beyond curious. either the exit polls were wrong or the vote count is wrong:

The exit poll numbers for Wisc., Pa., Ohio, Fla., Mn., NH. & N.C., were adjusted when
they were published.
Wisconsin Poll one 52-48 3rd 51-46 Final 52-47 Published 50-49

Pennsylvannia Poll one 60-40 3rd 54-45 Final 53-46 Published 51-49
Ohio Poll one 52-48 2nd 50-49 3rd 50-49 Final 51-49 Published 49-51
Florida Poll one 51-48 2nd 50-49 3rd 50-49 Final 51-49 Published 47-52
Minnesota Poll one 58-40 3rd 58-40 Final 54-44 Published 51-48
New Hampshire Poll one 57-41 3rd 58-41 Published 50-49
North Carolina Poll one 3rd 49-51 Final 48-52 Published 43-56

Taking the figures and measuring the size and direction of the poll to supposed vote count
discrepancy, we find the variance between the exit poll and the final result: Wisc. Bush +
4%, Pa. Bush +5%, Ohio Bush +4%, Fla. Bush +7%, Mn. Bush +7%, NH. Bush +15% &
N.C. Bush +9%. It seems like this last group of states are prime candidates for increased
scrutiny via audit trails. I wonder why none of the variances favored Kerry?
Electronic voting fraud may provide an explanation for the astonishing 8 million vote gain
made by George W. Bush in the 2004 presidential U.S. election. In Florida Bush received
a million extra votes, while Kerry received only 500,000 extra votes, in spite of a massive
Democratic Get-Out-The-Vote(GOTV) and registration campaign in that state;
In Broward County, a democratic stronghold and heavily black community, unauditable
voting machines recorded a 33% (70,000+) vote gain on Bush's 2000 results and a much
smaller gain to Kerry – again Broward was the scene of a massive GOTV campaign;
In several places voters reported voting for Kerry but noticing the machine record their
vote for Bush;
University of California computer scientists have demonstrated an ability to
insert a hidden, self-erasing program on a voting machine that passes the testing without
detection and then switches votes during election mode.

Chap 11 Noun and Verb, rob
Page 123 - 131
The FTP site was used to provide updates to the GEMS database. 25% of the machines on
the floor would fail KSU testing…In DeKalb County we updated 1,800 machines in a day
and a half. We had a couple hundred machines done when in comes a new update over the
phone.. They’d say ‘oh, no, no, the way we had you do, that’s not going to work, here’s
another thing to do….That fix that Diebold provided for us, well, they were never tested.
They just said ‘oh, here’s the problem, go ahead and fix it.’..The freeze up problem
remained for over 50% of the machines. Turn it on, get one result. Turn it on six times and
you get six different results….Bugszilla report numbers 1150 to 2150 are missing for the
time period June-October 2002. No bug reports for Georgia can be found….A listing of
electronic patches dated 6-13-2002, 7-2-2002. 7-4-2002, 7-5-2002. 8-8-2002. The techs
were stitching new updates into the voting machines right up to election day 11-5-2002.

Chap 12 Open Source Exam, the first public examination of the Diebold computer code
Page 142-148
What is the purpose of the manual entry feature if you have optical scanners?...One
programmer was interested in the central count GEMS system because the code for the
GEMS system is the key and it wasn’t available…The user manuals do not say who can
make manual entries but does include a section for remote access to the database (of votes
cast)….The fact that they’re using Microsoft Access you’re dealing with basically a toy
database with limited security features. If you have write capability you have delete
capability. It shouldn’t be used in a voting application because all programmers know
there is no security in Access….The server at the county that accumulates all the
incoming votes (GEMS) is an attractive tampering target, and altering the GEMS log is
quite easy…One programmer said “ With GEMS (server) installed on my (laptop?)
computer I was able to create a password “Mac” and assign myself ADMIN capabilities.
This was without signing into GEMSall I had to do was create a new database and I was

Page 150-1
States like Georgia have laws that make it impossible to get a disputed machine adequately
inspected. Georgia requires a patent attorney and two mechanics to look at the machine in
question. If either of the “mechanics” asks how the machine works the attorney is there to
tell them ‘it’s proprietary information’ you’re not allowed to know.”

Page 153
Having PCMCIA card installed allows remote access via airwaves. They’re using simple
PCMCIA ATA disks with almost non-existent security. You wouldn’t even need to hack
the wireless network – just pop out one hard drive of results and pop in another with new
results (votes) preconfigured. With wireless communications in the voting system means
that anyone could connect to the voting machines via wireless network, and make changes
to the voting programs and/or the vote counts.

Page 156-157
To stuff the ballot box you enter two totals that cancel each other out: for example ‘plus
50,000 for McCain, minus 50,000 for Obama.’ This creates a gain of 100,000 votes for
McCain before the election begins. To hide the fact that the ballot box have been stuffed
the computer programmer makes the report read zero when you start the election by
instructing the code to put a string of zeroes into the ‘zero report’ if there are any negative
numbers in the system. The audit trail will catch this if a comparison of Republican
and Democrat voters showing up are compared to the totals cast for each candidate
at each polling place and the totals are not too far apart.

Page 157-158
Lets run a totals report to see what the election supervisor sees. I opened the GEMS
program – ran a totals report showing the overall election results. Then I ran a detail report
showing the results in each precinct. Now open the file in Microsoft Access without
closing GEMS because Access is configured for multiple users. Two people can wander
around in the vote databases at the same time without bumping into each because there are
two programs, GEMS seen by the elections supervisor and the MS Access database (the
back door) that stores the votes which the elections supervisor does not see.

Click on a table called CandidateCounter to see how many votes the candidate has
accumulated for each polling place. There is another table in the vote database, called
SumCandidateCounter. This table had the same information as CandidateCounter – in two
complete sets of the same information. One set was marked by a flag, the number “1”
Notice this gives us three sets of votes.
Change some of the vote totals in SumCandidateCounter and go into GEMS and run the
totals report. The totals report showed my new numbers, proving I could alter the report
by going in the back door and replacing vote totals with my own. If you go back and look
at the detail report it still has the original votes, not the ones I changed. We now have two
sets of books. It’s important to have the detail report show the real votes while the
summary shows the ones changed because it allows a manipulated system to pass a spot

Page 159
Altering the audit log. In every version of GEMS that I examined, the auto numbering
feature was disabled, allowing anyone to add, change and delete items from the audit
without leaving a trace. The GEMS program allows anyone to enter negative votes. Why?
The entire process of bypassing the password, changing the vote totals, cleaning up the
vote log took less than 10 minutes.

Chap 13 Security Breeches
Page 166-169
A vote tabulation saved at 3:31 PM, five hours before poll closing for the March 5, 2002,
San Luis Obisbo (SLO) County primary was found on the Diebold FTP site. This file
contains an audit log which documents GEMS activities step by step for months leading up
to the election, stopping precisely at 3:31 pm on March 5, 2002. The votes in the file
correspond with the final vote tally, which can be found on the SLO county web site for
that election – but only about 40% of the votes had come in by 3:31 PM. The SLO vote
file was assigned a password and placed on a Diebold-owned FTP site. The password was
Sophia. Sophia Lee was a Diebold project manager. Was she there that day? Yes.
Somehow this file made its way from the secure, inaccessible, locked-in-a-room, not-
connected computer onto the Diebold company FTP site. The question is - did the
voting machines have an E.T. moment and decided to phone home while the election
was in progress? The explanation that the totals at 3:31 PM were absentee votes is
unreasonable because that means only absentee votes were counted in the election.

A memo from Sophia Lee dated March 4, 2008, the day before the election: SLO County –
“Cards cast for precincts in multiple vote centers are incorrect”. Sophia’s memo is a bug
report showing that the software is miscounting the day before the election. It references
“GEMS Report 1-17-21,” a version that does not have a NASED certification number.

Page 171
A “bad memory card” reported votes correctly in every race except the presidential
race, where it changed Gore’s total to a minus 16,022. (This could have happened by
inserting into the voter-database a minus 100,000 votes for Gore and a plus 100,000
votes for Bush. The problem showed up when only 83,978 votes were cast for Gore in
this precinct leaving the 16,022 minus vote. How many other precincts had a similar
minus applied to Gore’s totals but were not caught because the total votes for him
were more than the minus inserted into his totals against him?)

Page 178
The fact that “negative votes” could be applied to a candidate’s total demonstrates a flawed
software model that calls into question the competence and integrity of the programmers,
the company and the certification process itself..

Page 192+
Jeffrey Dean had the pass code to the GEMS computer and 24-hour access to the building
and to the programs that count 800,000 votes. He also had access to the entire suite of
optical-scan software used in 37 states and the security-sensitive Windows CE program for
the touch screens. He had access to our votes but is not allowed to access handling any
checks because of his conviction on 23 counts of felony theft.

How could anyone with this history be hired to count votes?

This link leads to a web site that discusses the 2004 exit poll numbers of the major
cities in the US. Their chart shows that comparing 2000-2004 votes Bush received an
additional 4 million votes while Kerry received about 2.5 million votes in cities that
usually vote Democratic. How could this happen?

Legislation is needed to establish a minimum standard of security for any machine that is
involved in the vote counting process. All software should be programmed to only accept
positive numbers. Some type of red flag should appear in the viewing screen if a minus
number is included in the vote totals.

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hi rina Monday, Dec. 01, 2008 at 7:10 PM
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